Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind ( Explorations in Cognitive Science) [Jerry A. Fodor] on *FREE* shipping on. FODOR’S PSYCHOSEMANTICS Jerry Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy ofMind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press,. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat shorter one called Reply to Jerry Fodor’s IIndividualism and Supervenience.’ ” Paper.

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But it only takes Quine half-seriously. What I am suggesting is that the relation of teleosemantics with ethology it is not as analogous to, say, the philosophy of time with fundamental physics as one may think. That seems right to me. Science works slowly, in fits and starts, with one group bringing in a piece of the puzzle. When we show movies of rabbit fodog coming together, pulling apart, we see that two such nodes are activated when apart, one node when together, and this tracks the psychophysics, etc.

What are the implications of these moves for this account? Obviously brains absorb and use information to get about in the world. Tomatoes look just like tomatoes-or-Xgiven that the first disjunct is present.

Nice pointer on the Lewis. About your new premise 1: This is evident when we consider our own, human, representational states. Rather, I am inclined to give up the often implicit idea that the represents relation is like the lexical reference relation, or that we have psychosemantjcs concepts.

In terms of the visual system concern specifically, I have a few thoughts.

Psychosemantics Quotes

This is also why the details matter. Many thanks for that! I completely agree that our theories of the mind should be applicable to all creatures. My sense was that you seemed rather fosor of this problem of informational specificity. On this point, I have to part ways with Robert Brandom. Hey Josh, this is just a quick thought in response to your last couple posts.


One thing might be non-naturalism about mental content, as Adam notes.

Do you think you know the contents of your perceptual representations a priori? Of course, this is basically what Dretske already said in KFI digital v analog contents, conceptual complexity measures to differentiate coextensional contents, etc.

I think the large contingent of Berkeley PhDs might have had something to do with that answer. Highly doubtful, even at the retinal or thalamic level!

Regardless, those are details to be argued about, all in a context that sees information as a crucial, ineliminable, idea.

Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics

So, you are proposing to correct the scientific practice, right? Maybe I was the one that suggested this was something of a consensus view.

This strikes me as being the wrong way to proceed. Call it the Received View RV. Maybe you should have a fight with Dan about that.

Was Psychosemantics a Failure?

How much science is necessary? From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy cognet.

One might not be able to generate counterexamples, but then again herry might not get these conditions to apply very widely. There are vast numbers of local fitness enhancing states of affairs presence of food, presence of mate, presence of predator etc. This rethinking will involve looking again at some of the ideas of the nay sayers of the s, like Dennett and Stich, but looking fpdor afield as well. It seems this problem is partly solved by our visual system.

Part of her aim is to increase understanding by demonstrating this theoretical unity — with much attention, of course, devoted to the differences within the broad type.

Doede – – Tradition and Discovery 20 2: The rat is not, after all, a Sphex wasp, whose behavior is notoriously inflexible. This seems like a perfectly sound naturalistic, selectionist account of how the detectors came to be.

So, even if we conceded that thought is to some degree vague or ambiguous maybe I really am thinking of undetached rabbits partsthat would not eliminate the putative problems of incorrect content assignments. Sorry—the frog thing was referring back fodro the more general discussion. And perhaps you can make the case that spatial geometry is what matters to some consumer. Yup, this is right. Whereas the growing consensus among teleo folks seems to be that you need to consider both sides.


And we can say this because the most natural causal-explanatory account of the selection of this system mentions objects, not undetached object parts.

It jrrry does depend on the details here, as Manolo intimated. One might think that there are some who insist that accounts of representation must do certain explanatory work, and are pessimistic, and others that think that more modest and worthwhile explanatory goals are within reach.

In Models in the Brain too, but easier to find in the article! Or am I completely missing the point here?

Was Psychosemantics a Failure? – The Brains Blog

The carburetor in my car ultimately helps my car move, but that would be a myopic view of its function it makes my car move because it ignores the local causal role of the carb where are its inputs coming from, what are its consumers. It seems the visual system cares deeply about object-hood and the Gestalt psychologists saw this of course. Wondering—asking questions internally, as it were—is another state that is only indirectly linked to stimuli and behavior. But I think it has the unfortunate effect of blinding the philosopher to the importance of the role that the state plays in the broader cognitive system.

We look into its role in the system for carrying out some task we think is important.